

Chapter Three

The Changing Nature of Terrorism

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Introduction

As one who has systematically studied terrorism since the mid-seventies I am very sensitive to the dangers of seeking to forecast new trends in terrorists, organization, motivation, tactics, strategies, and capabilities. The very nature of terrorist organizational doctrine with its emphasis on clandestine activities makes it difficult to ascertain changes in the immediate and near future, much less engage in an over-the-horizon strategic assessment of the changing nature of terrorism. Both analytically and operationally one can contend that if there is "a fog of war," there most certainly is "a smog of terrorism," which makes it particularly difficult to look through a very opaque analytical crystal ball. The challenge of engaging in a longer-term assessment is further exacerbated by the understandable concern among policy makers and those involved in the operational arts to address the immediate threat, which often comes into focus after a particularly egregious and sensational act of terrorism. Terrorism analysis is therefore often essentially short term and reactive in nature as one crisis after another defines our understanding of terrorism through a narrow focus on the development of measures to deal with the current threat environment. Moreover, assessments often take on labels representing what may be "trendy," since they may be promoted by media coverage and temporarily be of concern to the public but not necessarily represent longer-term developments. Thus, for example today's emphasis on "Weapons of Mass Destruction," while certainly a most valid concern, is not new, but it is partially the result of the impact of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks that it is being given a level of policy and public attention that was often ignored despite the

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long-term concerns of scholars and practitioners in the counterterrorism community. Similarly, the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Murrah Federal Building energize policy makers to the reality of large-scale domestic acts despite the fact that these domestic threats were of very real concern to counterterrorism specialists as early as the late sixties and early seventies.¹

The problem of engaging in long-term forecasting is further complicated by two additional considerations. Firstly, the contexts or environments in which acts of terrorism mutate are often the result of slowly evolving social, economic, or political developments that are not amenable to current identification. The seizure of the hostages in Iran and the development of Islamic extremist groups who use terrorism as a weapon in the pursuit of their objectives were in many ways the outward culmination of a long-term, slowly emerging movement that was deeply embedded in history and that in part is a reaction to the crusades. Secondly, the rapid transformation of technology has also been difficult to predict. It took time for scholars to address the profound impact the mass media and particularly the "CNNDrome" would have on the development of modern terrorism.² Who could have predicted the explosive growth of the Internet much less its increasingly profound influence on the strategies and capabilities of a new generation of terrorists? Nevertheless despite the dangers of engaging in predicting through "the smog of terrorism," the task is important if we are either constantly going to "fight the last war" (or incident) or be caught off guard by new developments on the techniques of terrorism that we have not identified. Will we be constantly caught in a reactive cycle of incident and response instead of catching up and moving beyond the rapidly changing learning curve of contemporary and future terrorists?

In seeking to engage in a future assessment it would be fruitless to attempt to identify an all-encompassing list of potential threats with a concomitant goal of developing an equally all-encompassing list of

countermeasures. Change is not that orderly. Moreover this assessment will not seek a high level of specificity in discussing future challenges. Others can and will develop scenarios based on present and future strategic assessments and may also refine the means of dealing with them. Therefore the following broad-based assessment of the changing nature of terrorism is primarily intended to promote discussions of the future challenges—to look beyond and for a brief time stand apart from the daily contingency-driven threats that they must address. In so doing, perhaps one can more effectively anticipate new threats that in one form or another will most assuredly threaten US national security. This chapter will therefore focus on the following areas of inquiry: (1) the **environment** and context that may help to identify and explain longer-term changes in the nature of terrorism. (2) the **motivation** that may in part stem from the changes in the environment and may transform the goals of the terrorists. (3) the impact of **technological transformation** on terrorist capabilities and (4) **organizational doctrine** that may change the long-term nature of terrorism in regard to the new demands such changes may place on those who are responsible for countering terrorism.

Before initiating the assessment it is important to note that the imperfect process of predicting is not intended to be ahistorical. There is a base line of knowledge that has identified various aspects of the characteristics and history of terrorism.³ While this essay recognizes that there is a degree of continuity in the goals of terrorism over the centuries since the days of the Zealots and Assassins that are important in engaging in strategic prediction, the focus of the following study will be on change, not continuity.

The Environment

On the international level the Cold War provided a degree of outward equilibrium and cohesiveness produced as a result of the balance of nuclear terror. The super-powers, having learned the dangers of direct confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, utilized "the indirect approach" in the pursuit of

their foreign policy objectives through the use of various forms of proxy war in support of client states or against unfriendly governments. Whether it was in El Salvador or Afghanistan, both Moscow and Washington sought to achieve their goals by seeking to manage conflicts without running the risk of full-scale conventional or nuclear war. While the dangers of confrontation were always possible, a degree of international order was achieved at great cost.

The imposition of outward order was particularly seen in the former Soviet Union where primordial loyalties in the form of ethnic identification, religious values, proto-national movements, or a combination of these and other loyalties were subject to the control of and often hidden under the domination of Moscow. These would surface with the call for self-determination with the breakdown of the Soviet Empire. This assertion of "primordial loyalties" of course was not solely related or limited to the fundamental transformation in the USSR and its satellites.⁴ Throughout the new states of the transitional area as well as the old industrialized states "primordial loyalties" competed with the veneer of a national identity, particularly in the former colonies, that often did not exist beyond the confines of the capitol. The "new world disorder" opened up a Pandora's Box of new conflicts often based on deeply held old loyalties.

The assertion of these loyalties has led one authority to suggest that on the global level the competition between the super-powers has been replaced by a new paradigm of geopolitical conflict, the "clash of civilizations" where "...the great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."⁵ But, it can be suggested that this paradigm is ultimately the result of the manifestation of two often-contradictory forces—modernization and tradition. What we may be now witnessing is the assertion of traditional beliefs in an expanding and increasingly interdependent social, economic, and political global environment. The very interdependence created by technology, as perhaps

best personified by the impact of the medium of modern communication, has led to a reaction by forces of tradition who to varying degrees reject the construct of contemporary mass society that is often equated with what are perceived to be the highly secular values of the West. Whether this assertion, this quest for community takes place and is accommodated within a developed country—devolution associated in the Scots, Welsh, and the continued conflict in Northern Ireland, or whether it transcends a region—the full sweep of Islamic fundamentalism, one fact remains. We are not witnessing the "End of History" but the reassertion of traditional values in an expanding technological environment.⁶ As a result of this tectonic geopolitical shift, political violence in its many forms and particularly in regards to terrorism has become a central aspect of contemporary societal and political competition, replacing the rhetoric, strategies, visions, and tactics that were either used to motivate or explain terrorism as an aspect of super-power competition motivated or justified on the basis of competing ideologies.

In conjunction with the assertion of traditional loyalties is the increased breakdown of the nation-state as the major entity in international affairs. The state-centric model is now under assault as the superficial loyalty to idealized nation-states, particularly in the Third World, has been replaced either by transnational movements or subnational movements that are rejecting the legitimacy of the arbitrary constructs of states that were largely the result of the imposition of legalistic or physical boundaries of nation-states that ignored the more profound psycho-social boundaries that can bring people together or apart.⁷ With this breakdown of community, legitimacy, and order, we are now confronted with the reality that large areas of the world are for all intents and purposes ungovernable and are in effect part of the "...the world's 'gray area' where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political, half criminal powers."⁸ The mythic body politic that defined and institutionalized terms of the relations among nations and the politics within

states is now being transformed as new players now seek to alter the course of international politics.

These new players will certainly be influenced and will utilize what could be called "a revolution in terrorist affairs" fueled by the technological revolution that also characterizes contemporary international affairs. As we shall see, this revolution will at the minimum lead to the continued enhancement of the weapons that can be used by the terrorists—from fertilizer bombs to portable nuclear weapons. Such innovation will also have profound impact on the ways in which terrorists will spread their message of fear and intimidation—from pamphlets to the Internet. And perhaps most significantly, terrorists' technological innovation may also have a profound impact on the development of new organizational doctrine that will greatly enhance the ability of a new generation to increase their capabilities and yet at the same time make it easy to avoid detection.

The changing environment and the context in which terrorists will operate will therefore transform an enduring threat that at one hand uses the weapons and tactics as old as history with the most modern instrumentalities of violence today.

Motivation

While traditional motivation to resort to terrorism will continue and indeed be amplified because of the assertion of "primordial loyalties," the motivation may be analyzed as a function of frustration, relative deprivation, ethnic, racial, and religious strife, and other commonly ascribed causes of violence. Motivational factors may also change in response to the new conflict environment.

At the outset, the cosmopolitan ideology that was used to fuel wars of national liberation as well as campaigns of terrorism has largely lost its salience in contemporary political life. While Marxist-Leninist thought may almost have been assigned to "the dust bin of history," it did provide a world view and accompanying coherence in the form of doctrine, ideology, and

strategy that was used to foment classic revolutionary "internal wars" and regional conflicts which employed terrorist acts and campaigns in the name of and for leftist ideologies.⁹ What will replace a blueprint—a strategy—for the use of violence and terrorism as an aspect of political protracted warfare that, however challenging, was understood and therefore capable of being countered through the appropriate policies, doctrines, and strategies?¹⁰

In the first place just as we see the assertion of traditional loyalties, we will also witness the increased significance of such values in motivating those holding primordial loyalties to reassert themselves as we enter the new millennium. Rising religious fundamentalism will increasingly be employed to recruit terrorists and justify their acts by movements and organizations who reject the existing state system and its secular values. While there has been a focus on Islamic fundamentalism, it is vital to remember that all the major religions have their own zealots who in their rejection of the current order are not seeking to replace one political system with a theocracy or a system that most closely reflects their religious beliefs and practices. Both Middle Eastern and what can be called the American Ayatollahs share much in common. They seek a fundamental transformation in core values, and their applicability to the political, economic, and social system. It should also be noted, particularly in the case of various fundamentalist sects in Islam and Judaism, that there is no separation between church and state. Furthermore these extremists who may resort to terrorism view their objectives to be divinely ordained and therefore will never be satisfied in seeking compromise "solutions." For they not only have a commitment to engage in what has traditionally been called a "protracted war," but a protracted Holy War, which is grounded in historical myth and reality and affirmed on the basis of achieving preordained goals over the long term. Armed with the strength of a commitment that transcends secular politics and indeed a temporal world, the new breed of terrorists as we shall see may not be concerned about public opinion in this life as they seek to achieve their goals. The suicide bomber by

his or her act of destruction is engaged in a transcendental personal journey that places no limits and indeed justifies mass terrorism. This transformation will have serious implications on the ability of analysts to understand those who are motivated by the most fundamental beliefs since their beliefs will not necessarily be concerted to action on the basis of a rational choice or cost/benefit model of decision-making but will be driven by a commitment that ignores our attempts to primarily understand terrorism in the context of purposeful, rational violence to achieve a readily identified goal. Moreover the proliferation of sects with their inclusiveness, paranoia, charismatic leaders, and beliefs that cannot be understood in the context of traditional religious doctrine opens up yet another area of profound uncertainty and danger in terrorist innovation; uncertainty, because it will not be clear what these groups want, and danger, for they will have at their disposal and be willing to use weapons of mass destruction and may not be concerned with limiting their violence so as to not totally alienate public opinion in the quest for their goals.

The changing nature of terrorist motivation will further be complicated by the increased significance of new non-state actors who may use political rhetoric as a means of justifying their acts of carnage, when in reality they may be ultimately apolitical. These apolitical terrorists come from an ancient tradition or organized and unorganized crime going back to the syndicates of the past—the Cosa Nostra, the Triads, and now the Russian mafia. Their power has increased with the breakdown of the nation-state system. They have found a fertile ground for extortion and other criminal activities in the "gray area" and will increasingly use terrorism to achieve a degree of power and wealth. They have and will increasingly attempt to form alliances, work with or co-opt governments and, in so doing, achieve a level of legitimacy undreamed of by such groups in the past.

The motivation will also be changed by the emergence of "single issue" terrorists groups who will increasingly utilize modern technology and

particularly the Internet to dramatize and coordinate acts of terrorism in the pursuit of their own often very idiosyncratic objectives. These groups will be very difficult to counter given their small size, their lack of a track record and coherent and well-known programs of action, and they will not fit within the past ideological spectrum of former terrorist groups that often explained particular terrorist goals during the Cold-War epoch.

What will also complicate terrorists' motivation will be the possible emergence of new groups that will practice and refine their own form of "terror from above."¹¹ These groups will not necessarily be utilizing terrorism as an instrument of state repression. They may not be the right-wing death squad of the past but the amalgam of criminals, and apparecnicks who will use terrorism to maintain state repression and power. They represent the evolution of modern feudalism and fiefdoms that will not seek political legitimacy as a means of maintaining control. The "new lords" will combine the traditional means of engaging in regime repression with the technologies of control and intimidation that, as we shall see, are a manifestation of a "revolution in terrorist affairs."

The above analysis does not mean to imply that traditional motivations will not be significant in promoting future terrorists acts. But it is necessary to recognize that there are new actors, with changing values and goals that will be major forces in shaping the changing nature of terrorism.

Technology Transformation

It is perhaps the transformation in technology that will most significantly alter the nature of terrorism in the 21st Century. Just as the introduction of jet aircraft in the late 50's and early 60's transformed territorial terrorism into a form of non-territorial terrorism which used the medium of space to conduct operations and the introduction of satellite television enabled terrorists to almost instantaneously reach a global audience, so have new developments increased their capabilities.¹²

On the lower level of the technological spectrum, while classic bombs in the form of fertilizer and oil and their modern replacement, Semtex, will continue to be used, one can anticipate that a whole host of more compact and powerful explosive materials will be available to the terrorist. The compact nature of the material coupled with its changing composition will make such material even harder to detect even as a wide variety of new sensors have been developed to assist the traditional x-ray and magnetometer as illustrated by the employment of the thermal neutron activation technique to detect explosives. The constant battle between those who develop detection technology and those who develop counter techniques of masking explosive devices and other agents of destruction will in all probability intensify with the acceleration of technological innovation. The problems associated with detection and screening will further be complicated by the proliferation of relatively easy, small, hand- and shoulder-held weapons along with other portable devices. Furthermore one can anticipate a further miniaturization of terrorist weapons systems.

The unfortunate enhancement of terrorist destructive capabilities and concomitant tactical flexibility will further be enhanced by the continued development and availability of laser weapon systems that have already very effectively "painted" targets. Therefore a new generation of terrorists will have very marked improvement using new "stand-off weapons" with a far greater degree of accuracy than the "stand-off weapons" of the past. The challenges to those responsible for developing effective counterterrorism physical security means in general and those who must specifically address force protection requirements are very daunting. Furthermore, these new weapons capabilities will make it increasingly difficult to establish effective perimeters and fixed security zones against them. How can even the most innovative, technologically sophisticated physical security measures cover enough territory and be impenetrable to neutralize a new family of weapons including the increased use of electromagnetic pulses? Moreover one can also

anticipate that the current development of a wide variety of non-lethal weapons will also enter the terrorist arsenal giving them another tool to engage in both psychological intimidation against the immediate victims and a larger target audience. Such weapons which ideally attempt to make the application of force in law enforcement and warfare "more humane" may be a potent "fear multiplier" in the hands of a dedicated and skillful terrorist.¹³

In both the short and long terms, the impact of technology on terrorist weapons and capabilities is particularly significant in an increasingly more lethal terrorist threat environment. On one hand the existence of portable nuclear devices is of a current concern especially given problems of inventory and command and control in the former Soviet Union. In addition, the technology to develop such weapons can now more readily be disseminated along with information on two companion threats in regards to mass terrorism—chemical and biological weapons. In regards to these weapons a major problem for terrorists has been the danger that they can fall victim to the highly volatile material they handle and the problems associated with targeted or general dispersal of chemical and biological agents. Unfortunately one can readily anticipate the dispersal technique or the delivery systems will improve in conjunction with more effective safeguards in the illicit manufacturing of such weapons.

What has been particularly significant has been the logical extension of the profound impact of television and satellite communication through the rapidly developing and expanding use of the Internet and the revolutionary change that characterizes all aspects of computer technology. The terrorists now have at their disposal the medium to disseminate information and increasingly coordinate attacks against a wide range of targets from the relative safety of cyber space. In addition they will increasingly be able to conduct terrorism against the vulnerable technological infrastructure of industrial and post-industrial societies by targeting critical infrastructure, particularly in reference to computer facilities and networks. Through their

actions, they will have the potential to directly and indirectly place large numbers of people in harm's way by degrading an air traffic control network, public health care system, or other complex system that can profoundly threaten both personal and societal security.

The technological transformation, particularly through the Internet will also equip terrorists groups with a new weapon of terrorism—virtual terrorism. Even if their threats may not be actualized through the use of the net, they magnify their threat. In effect they can create a climate of fear and intimidation that is a hallmark of terrorism by utilizing the Internet to not only spread their message of intimidation but also by create the perception that their threat has become a reality. The tragic case of TWA 800 illustrates the point. Pierre Salinger's contention that the aircraft was shot down by a missile was the product of a report from the Internet that was not validated. Yet, despite the conclusions of careful investigations, the missile theory still "has legs" grounded in the perception of an increasingly cynical public who utilizes conspiracy theories as a means of seeking to understand the complexities of modern political life. The Internet has been used to announce the Abu Nidal organization's Jihad and the intents of numerous other groups as well. If as Brian Jenkins noted, "terrorism is a form of theater aimed at the people watching," it is now a form of Internet communication where people can think they are actually experiencing an act of terrorism.

Beyond these future threats created by technology exist a whole host of new weapons, targets, and vulnerabilities that have yet to be identified. I will defer to the futurists. But one thing is quite clear—while terrorists have in many ways utilized traditional weapons of destruction and will continue to do so, they are not adverse to, and are indeed very innovative in, refining their capacity to engage in murder with frightening efficiency.

Organizational Doctrines and Capabilities

There is one area of change that may be at the nexus of the changes in the terrorist environment, motivation and technological transformation—terrorist

organizational doctrine and attendant capability. The following discussion is not meant to imply that the core of understanding the dynamics of the changing nature of terrorism is predicated on organizational change by itself, but the impact of that change may none-the-less be very significant in charting the nature of terrorism in the 21st century.

Presently we are witnessing the emergence of a wide diversity of terrorists groups. While there will still be state sponsorship, sophisticated regional and transnational terrorist networks, we now also see a myriad of new groups who are held together based on commitments to a wide variety of sub-national loyalties, religious/cultists beliefs. In effect what we have seen and will increasingly see is the development of the "free floating terrorist group," a small cell-like organization that is not as in the past a combat compartmentalized entity that is part of a larger clandestine hierarchy. This type of stand-alone, mini-terrorist group may operate within an environment of racial, ethnic, and anti-government hatred, for example, but it does not have specific organizational ties to a larger organization nor is dependent on some level of support from a larger organization, a front group or a sector of the community. These "free floating" groups have already made their horrendous mark in the United States experience. Thus, while conspiracy debate will continue, the fact remains that a small terrorist "free-floating group" was able to perpetrate the worse domestic terrorist act with the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma. In addition terrorists well-trained in survival techniques have and will continue to evade detection because of their skills and size. Eric Robert Rudolph, currently on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 10 Most Wanted list after being linked to bombings at the 1996 Olympic Games and Atlanta area clinics, continues to evade authorities. These "bubba cells" should not be taken lightly. They serve to underscore that one does not need sophisticated organizational design or capabilities to engage in major acts of terrorism. Furthermore, given their small size and the fact that they are not dependent on a larger organization or community, they are

difficult to identify, intercept, or penetrate than more sophisticated organizations with their own networks and track records. The term "small is beautiful" is unfortunately most salient in the changing terrorist organizational doctrine of various terrorist groups.

The potency of such organizations has long been realized. In J.K. Zawodony's pioneering article "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organization" the author discusses what he calls the "centrifugal infrastructure" of terrorist groups. According to him, such structures have significant advantages over the traditional "ladder hierarchy" that characterizes most organizations and particularly governmental bodies' organizations in general and more specifically the security, police, and military forces responsible for countering terrorism. Such advantages include direct and rapid communication and independence from society support.¹⁴ As governments seek to counter this organizational advantage two fundamental questions must be raised: (1) Can one use a ladder hierarchy to defeat a centrifugal hierarchy? (2) Can a government effectively develop centrifugal hierarchies while maintaining command and accountability over such organizations?

The strength of the centrifugal organization will in all likelihood be intensified because of technological advancement. In the past the centrifugal "free floating" nature of such organizations had an adverse effect on these groups to engage in coordinating campaigns of terrorism. But now that negative effect has been lessened via the Internet. For the Internet can provide a means for coordination among these mini-groups without sacrificing their independence and unity. The impact of the computer and particularly the medium of the Internet has led to the development of netwar.

...the term netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of small dispersed groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns

in an internetted manner, without a precise central command. Thus, netwar differs from modes of conflict and crime in which the protagonists prefer hierarchical organization doctrine, and strategies, as in the past efforts to build, for example centralized movements along Leninist lines.¹⁵

David Ronfeldt then provides excellent illustration about current organizational innovation and the future direction of terrorist organizational doctrines and strategies.

Netwar is about the Middle East's Hamas more than the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Mexico's Zapatistas more than Cuba's Fidelistas, and America's Christian Patriotic movement more than the Ku Klux Klan. It also is about Asian Triads more than the Sicilian Mafia, Chicago's "Gangsta Deciples" more than the Al Capone Gang.¹⁶

The modification of the traditional terrorist's centrifugal organization through the use of the computer and the Internet fused with the growing significance of non-state or non-governmental actors will provide terrorists with a degree of flexibility coupled with an ability to coordinate attacks without loss of security. The modification may also force counterterrorism analysts to reorient their frame of reference beyond the model of traditional terrorist organizations which often combined a hierarchical organization in terms of leadership with the cellular nature of the combat cell. There will be an absence of a highly organized and identifiable terror network that in the past could be penetrated by technical intelligence or when state sponsorship did exist through penetration via the hostile intelligence service. Again it is worth noting that government counterterrorism organizations increasingly model themselves at the tactical level using the centrifugal model of their adversary without the loss of accountability and control that could lead, as in the past, to the development of "rogue elephants" whose absence of accountability may also lead to ignoring the policy directives of the political leadership.

Finally, the reorientation of counterterrorism organizations will require closer integration with non-state actors who are increasing their capability to act independently of government authority in the conduct of counter terrorist operations. Corporate and private counterterrorism services have increased in terms of numbers and, while their quality is uneven, there are "state of the art services." But would such services be willing to share proprietary information concerning threats that directly affect their organization, and on the other pole, would government at all levels be willing to share equally sensitive information with the private and corporate sector?

Conclusion: Placing the Threat in Context: Short- and Long-term Implications

The history of modern terrorism can be characterized by terrorist innovation manifested in threats and acts of violence followed by reaction on the part of governments at all levels. There is a major theme that emerges in the so called "war against terrorism," that it is a "war" which is primarily defensive and a "war" where short-term tactical considerations are not integrated into or take precedence over the vital requirement to develop long-term counter terrorism policies, doctrines, and strategies. In the short term the focus shifts from one major group (or personality) to another—from Carlos to Bin Laden, and from low-level threat awareness to high-level concerns—usually after an incident as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo and the current concern about weapons of mass destruction. This is not to negate the danger of current threats, but the changing nature of terrorism will place a heavy responsibility on policy makers, analysts, and planners to look beyond the present threat environment and address the continuing impact of the dialectic of modern terrorism—the clash between traditional primordial loyalties versus an assertion of regional and universal demands, of low-tech weaponry versus high-tech weapon systems, and the power of the pen vis-a-vis the impact of the Internet, and the clash of accompanying motivation varying from deeply held religious beliefs to terrorism as a mercenary industry.

Unfortunately, given the focus on current threats, changes in the political climate, the recurrence of bureaucratic turf battles, and now more than ever the need for international cooperation to combat terrorism in an increasingly discordant and fragmented world "order," the future of the war on terrorism remains as bleak as the vaunted war against drugs. Admittedly, the causes for violence that lead to terrorism, as in the case the demand for drugs, are in part the result of more deeply embedded and very intractable societal problems that are difficult to resolve. But unless policy makers, planners, analysts, scholars, and most importantly the international community—however fragmented—attempt to see through the “smog of terrorism” and recognize the changes in the nature of terrorism, they will enter a new century which will be marked by acts and campaigns of terrorism that might lead not only to mass casualties but destroy an increasingly fragile interdependent social order.

¹ Robert K. Mullen, "Mass Destruction and Terrorism," *Journal of World Affairs* 32:1 (Spring/Summer 1978); Michael T. McEwen and Stephen Sloan, *Terrorism Preparedness on the State and Local Level: An Oklahoma Perspective*, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1980.

² The term “CNNDrome” was originated by Lt. Colonel David Bradford, USAF (Ret.).

³ For an excellent current text on terrorism see: Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁴ As taken from: Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer, 1993): 22.

⁶ As modified from Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (The Free Press, Inc., 1992).

⁷ Maurice A. East, "International System Perspective and Foreign Policy Perspective," in *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspective and Foreign Policy*, East and others eds, (Sage Publication, 1978), 145.

⁸ Xavier Raufer, "Gray Areas: A New Security Threat," *Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures and Terrorism Report* (Spring, 1992): 1.

⁹ As taken from Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (The Free Press, 1964), 73.

¹⁰ For a discussion of protracted war as an aspect of Low-Intensity Conflict and the alternative policies and measures to counter it see Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, eds, *Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in A New World* (Westview, 1992).

¹¹ Thomas Perry Thorton, "Terror as a Political Weapon," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (Free Press, 1964).

¹² Stephen Sloan, *The Anatomy of Non-Territorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay*, Clandestine Tactics and Technology Series, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978.

¹³ For a discussion of the policy dimensions of non-lethal weapons see John B. Alexander, *Rethinking National Security Requirements* (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1991).

¹⁴ J.K. Zawodny, "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations," in Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander, eds., *Perspectives on Terrorism* (1980).

¹⁵ David Ronfeldt and others, *The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico* (Arroyo Center, RAND, 1998), 9.

¹⁶ Ronfeldt, 9.